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to do can be wrong for
ical ase, some 50 years
ago, involved attorneys who were criticized and even
prosecuted for refusing to reveal to grieving parents the
location of buried bodies of children victimized by a
serial killer; this silence also ostensibly violated state
law requiring reporting of dead bodies. But lawyers for
the loathsome killer (who was nonetheless a client), did
the right thing by keeping quiet. See People v. Belge,
359 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1976). Attorney Francis Belge
fared less well when he refused to disclose details of a
retainer agreement with a corporate client and was held
in contempt. See People v. Belge, 59 A.D. 307 (Fourth
Dept. 1977)(refusal to disclose justified contempt
finding because corporate records were sought pursuant
to valid grand jury subpoena; Court notes concern
about businesses avoiding prosecution by funneling
incriminating documents through counsel).
Or consider the government's request
for attorney notes after Deputy Attorney
General Vincent Foster had committed
suicide and could not be interviewed by
the special prosecutor investigating alleged
misconduct concerning the firing of travel
agency personnel during the Clinton
Administration. Foster's law firm, even with
no live client to support, said "no," arguing
that the attorney-client privilege survived the
client's death. The Supreme Court agreed.
See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524
U.S. 399 (1998). But it was a 6-3 vote,
reversing a 2-1 D.C. Circuit panel decision,
that reversed the trial court's recognition
of the privilege (a 9-4 tally among all the
judges hearing the matter: a landslide in an
election, but hardly the unanimity lawyers
would like when structuring their decisions
about when to defy a court).
Lawyers need to make judgment
calls every day on issues of professional
responsibility in which the right answer
is not always clear, or seems clear only in
the retrospective wake of an authoritative
decision. Consider Gentile v. State Bar of
Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1998), where a
criminal defense lawyer decided that he was
justified in holding a press conference to
refute leaked information damaging to his
client and incurred state bar discipline, but
was vindicated by the U.S. Supreme Court...
but with four dissenting votes on aspects of
the decision and four separate opinions.
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In the wake of the case, ABA
Model Rule of Professional Conduct
3.6 (Trial Publicity)(subsequently
adopted as Nevada Rule of
Professional Conduct (RPC) 3.6) was
amended to provide that, even though
attorneys should not try cases in the
sanctioned over behavior that seems to
be well over the line of propriety and
relatively lacking in nuance. A review
of fairly recent Nevada decisions
reflects the range.
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by the panel). In particular, the
attorney had contacted a witness to
a will being disputed by counsel's
client. Counsel offered the witness
$7,000 in "exchange for your honest
testimony ... that you never [actually]
witnessed the Decedent signing a
will." According to the court, the
letter, which was several pages long,
threatened the witness "with personal
liability" and the legal implications of
perjury if the witness did not disavow
the will. See Id. at *2. A
similar communication was
sent to another witness.
The panel found
this constitutes an
impermissible offer
of money contingent
on testimony in
violation of RPC 3.4(b)
(Fairness to Opposing Counsel and
the Court) and an improper threat of
criminal prosecution in violation of
RPC 8.4(d)(Misconduct Prejudicial
to the Administration of Justice). The
court agreed, holding that the record
met the clear and convincing evidence
standard required for attorney
discipline. Id. at *3.
Callister illustrates once again a
variance in disciplinary matters that
can make counsel more than a little
uncomfortable. Two of the panel
members viewed the violations as
unintentional errors of overzealousness
in trying to ensure that witnesses
would be willing to be available, while
a third saw it as an intentional effort
to intimidate witnesses into providing
particular testimony favorable
to counsel's client and sought a
suspension of between 30 and 60
days. The split panel recommended
a public reprimand. The court found
that the misconduct was deliberate
or at least knowing (Id. at *7) and
imposed a suspension of 35 days, with
readmission conditional on completion
of six hours of CLE regarding the
Nevada RPCs. (Id. at *8).
continued on page 10 I
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In re Discipline oj Tref/inger,
393 P.3d 1084 (Nev. 2017)(attorney
entering conditional guilty plea of
heroin possession subject to diversion
program is subject to automatic
interim suspension during state bar
investigation and disciplinary process
but court stays suspension conditioned
on counsel's "continued adherence
to the terms and conditions of his
probation, his successful participation
in his diversion program, and the
absence of any further disciplinary
offenses" provided that that L
attorney provides the state bar with
quarterly compliance reports from
the probation officer and immediate
notification of any probation
violations).
In Treftinger, the court spells out
the operation of interim suspension
automatically triggered by a felony
conviction of an attorney and notes
that even a conditional guilty plea is
still a guilty plea and is a "conviction"
for purposes of SCR 111, making
the attorney a felon for purposes of
automatic interim suspension. See
393 P.3d at 1087. But because of
mitigating factors (e.g, first offense,
no prior bar discipline, no danger
to clients or public from continued
practice by attorney during probation
and participation in diversionary
program), the court exercised its
discretion to stay the automatic
suspension, something it may do if it
finds "good cause." See 393 P.3d at
1087-89.
Although reading of instances
of discipline or disqualification can
justify more than a little concern,
attorneys do not always lose. See, e.g.
New Horizons Kids Quest II, Inc. v.
District Court, 392 P.3d 166 (Nev.
2017)(attorney disqualification not
required by prior representation of
individual now adverse to counsel's
current client;
no showing that
challenged attorney
had gained actual
knowledge of
any information
protected by rules of confidentiality).
The attorney in question had
worked at a law firm defending
New Horizon Kids, a child care
facility, in a tort action but had not
participated in the case or learned
any confidential information about
the case. The attorney subsequently
joined another law firm that was
representing a plaintiff making a tort
claim against the facility (apparently
over a different incident, which
because of deference to trial court
discretion.
Because the right to counsel of
one's choice is important, particularly
in criminal prosecutions that implicate
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
there is precedent finding that the
"harmless error" concept does not
apply, at least in criminal matters.
See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-
Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006)(denial
of right to chosen counsel constitutes
complete constitutional violation not
subject to harmless error analysis);
Anava v. People, 764 P.2d 779 (Colo.
1988)(same). But see Gonzalez-Lopez,
supra, 548 U.S. at 153 (Alito, J.,
dissenting, joined by Justices Roberts,
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because they involve the operation of
the facility).
The New Horizons Kids case was
before the court on a writ of mandamus
seeking to require disqualification
after the trial court had refused to
disqualify. A mandamus grant and
reversal essentially requires a showing
of an "arbitrary and capricious exercise
of discretion" by the trial court or the
trial court's failure to perform an act
required by law. See International
Game Tech. v. District Court, 1 79 P.3d
556, 558 (Nev. 2006). If the trial court
had ordered disqualification, which
is not a final, immediately appealable
order, a disqualification based on the
same facts might be upheld on review
Kennedy and Thomas)(arguing that
defendant should be required to
make "at least some showing" that
erroneous disqualification ruling
adversely affected the quality of legal
representation received); In re Sabatino,
2016 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 4363
(Nov. 30, 2016)(harmless error standard
applied to erroneous disqualification
of counsel in state's "Orphan's Court"
dealing with probate and guardianship
matters). Nevada law, as I read it, is
unclear on this point.
Notwithstanding the mandamus
setting, New Horizons Kids reads as
a definitive court analysis of Rule 1.9
(providing for disqualification based
on prior representation of a currently
continued on page 12
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adverse party if the past and current
matter are "substantially related") and
imputed disqualification (Rule 1. 10,
which imputes an individual attorney's
disqualification to the entire law firm).
The court stated that Rule 1.10 applies
and taints an entire law firm only
if the attorney in question actually
acquired confidential information
about the particular former client
matter that forms the purported basis
for disqualification. See 392 P.3d at
169-70.
"The requirement that the
attorney actually acquire confidential
information about his former firm's
client is not a presumption; rather,
it is a factual matter for the district
court to resolve. In the absence of an
attorney acquiring such confidential
information, it follows that the
attorney is not disqualified, and
imputed disqualification pursuant
to RPC 1.10 does not apply." Id. at
169. An individual attorney must
have had actual access to confidential
information to "infect" a new
employer via RPC 1.10.
Prior to New Horizons Kids,
it could be argued that Nevada law
had a presumption that an attorney
in a law firm automatically acquired
confidential information about matters
being handled by the firm. The Nevada
Supreme Court has now made it clear
that this is not the case. An individual
attorney must have had actual access
to confidential information to "infect"
a new employer via RPC 1.10.
In application, even supposedly
"simple" rules of professional
responsibility can result in disparate
views regarding their application,
necessitating care by counsel. mL
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